Tom Boellstorff,in
Coming of Age in Second Life: An
Anthropologist Explores the Virtually Human, investigates the implications
of living in what he terms the Age of Techne and its effects on identity and
culture. Boellstorff describes the
design and purpose of his research highlighting the appropriateness of ethnography
as a method which mirrors the project he is undertaking. By “virtualizing” himself and inserting his
avatar in Second Life he goes above and beyond Malinowski’s injunction to “imagine yourself” in an
unfamiliar place. In this investigation
he intends to show that, contrary to prior research, “Second Life culture is
profoundly human. It is not only that
virtual worlds borrow assumptions from real life; virtual worlds show us how,
under our very noses, our “real” lives have been “virtual” all along. It is in being virtual that we are human:
since it is human “nature” to experience life through the prism of culture,
human being has always been virtual being” (5). Is this an accurate comparison?
Does culture mediate actual words in a way synonymous with the mediation of a
virtual world? To further delve into this complicated relationship between identity
and the virtual world, Boellstorff examines three aspects of Second Life in
particular: place, time and personhood.
Far
from diminishing the importance of place, Boellstorff highlights the ways that
conceptions and predominance of place and visuality which predate the emergence
of virtual worlds are transferred into Second Life. For instance, he notes the uproar and
argument over the visual blight of Zazzy’s store. Residents of Second life care
about the appearance of their surroundings and wish to avoid any marring of
their visual field, concerns which are common to actual world encounters even
prior to Second Life. This is just one
symptom of the condition of virtual worlds both reflecting and going beyond
aspects of the actual world. Boellstorff
remarks how very “real” second life real estate is in economic terms while simultaneously
noting a departure from actual world constraints with an increasing the amount
of available land, undercutting and complicating the actual world problem of
scarcity. The idea of place is further
complicated with the introduction of virtual virtual landscapes such as the one
Boellstorff describes encountering with Rhed, a large box, hundreds of meters
in the air, depicting countryside scenes.
Complications such as these, according to Boellstorff “demonstrate the
need for a theoretical framework that acknowledges the truly novel implications
of virtual worlds without predicating their significance on their being
different from the actual world” (101).
Boellstorff
marks a distinction between time and place in that time resists virtualization
in a way that place does not. This
resistance is necessary however, to allow for synchronic sociality. This was a key factor in making worlds seem
like “worlds” as the majority of social interaction occurred between residents “inworld”
at the same time. It did however cause
some problems, primarily with regards to what residents termed lag. Boellstorff posits that “lag reveals how a
problem with notions like “time/space compression” is that time resists
compression in a way that place does not; the death of distance” does not
correspond to a death of time” (102). Time in virtual worlds further undermined
theoretical perspectives in the context of Afk (away from keyboard). Traditionally, presence and immersion were
two commonly used terms in scholarly literature on online sociality. With Afk, one’s avatar could be “present”
while the user was “away”, thus “Afk ethnographically demonstrates the
possibility - indeed, the ubiquity- of presence
without immersion. This decoupling of
presence and immersion – the appearance of a gap between them – is one hallmark
of the virtual” (112). What does it mean for one to be present but not
immersed? What does this mean for sociality? Can it be fully excused by the
unique cultural practices acknowledged by residents of virtual worlds?
In his
discussion of personhood, Boellstroff describes the difficulty in determining
what constitutes the “real” person (is SL roleplay?, is the actual world role
play and SL a reflection of a truer self?, is participation in SL making the
actual more real?, etc.). Boellstorff
concludes that “just as it is possible to take virtual worlds in their own
terms, so it is possible to take virtual personhoods in their own terms. In both cases, the virtual is shaped in
powerful ways by referential and practical relationships to the actual world,
but these relationships help constitute the virtual self” (122). Taking them on their own terms however
becomes difficult when questions arise as to the meaning of outward appearance
in a world where physicality is completely malleable and users can control
multiple avatars, multiple users can control the same avatar or users can have
any number of alternate avatars or alts.
Boellstorff challenges “any ‘supposition conflating online interaction
with bodily transcendence’ and argue[s] for the reality of virtual embodiment”
(134). Gender, race, and disabilities
all had implications in Second Life. While
one’s embodiment was not fixed it was still not free from consequences in the
virtual world whether they were positively allowing for individuals with
disabilities a wider social network unattainable in the actual world or
negatively depicting racial stereotypes with last name selections, buildings,
or user creations.
Boellstorff
mentioned frequently the need to take the virtual world on its own terms as
related to, but separate from, the actual world. Do you think it is possible to understand it
in this way? Is the virtual world really a separate entity or does the overlap
and actual world implications negate that possibility? He also drew on the debate over the
utilization of voice capabilities in Second Life, noting that some thought that
the feature would make interactions more “real” while others believed it would
destroy the sociality of the virtual world.
What do you think? What makes virtual interaction fulfilling? Would
using voice instead of something like IMs destroy that? As an adjunct to that debate, Boellstorff
mentions the opportunity virtual sociality provides for individuals with
disabilities. To what degree should such considerations factor into the design
of virtual worlds like Second Life? Should their interests in particular be
considered because of the unique opportunities such an experience affords
them? Lastly, Boellstorff discusses globalization
and the linking of users worldwide in a common social space. Is this a positive
means of connection? What are the
implications of such widespread use, especially with regards to time and synchronous
sociality?
